{"doi":"10.1086/261385","title":"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control","abstract":"In a corporation with many small owners, it may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management. We explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to this free-rider problem. The model sheds light on the following questions: Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up? How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm? Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?","journal":"Journal of Political Economy","year":1986,"id":4183,"datarank":26.209157467209756,"base_score":9.053335623166017,"endowment":9.053335623166017,"self_citation_contribution":1.3580003434749028,"citation_network_contribution":24.851157123734854,"self_endowment_contribution":1.3580003434749028,"citer_contribution":24.851157123734854,"corpus_percentile":96.5,"corpus_rank":1993,"citation_count":8546,"citer_count":191,"citers_with_citation_signal":191,"citers_with_endowment":191,"datacite_reuse_total":0,"is_dataset":false,"is_oa":false,"file_count":0,"downloads":0,"has_version_chain":false,"published_date":"1986-06-01","authors":[{"id":42130,"name":"Robert W. Vishny","orcid":"0009-0000-0539-9872","position":1,"is_corresponding":false},{"id":42129,"name":"Andrei Shleifer","orcid":null,"position":0,"is_corresponding":true}],"reference_count":13,"raw_metadata":{"citation_network_status":"fetched"},"created_at":"2026-03-01T18:20:47.508186Z","pmid":null,"pmcid":null,"fwci":null,"citation_percentile":null,"influential_citations":0,"oa_status":null,"license":null,"views":0,"total_file_size_bytes":0,"version_count":0,"clinical_trials":[],"software_tools":[],"db_accessions":[],"linked_datasets":[],"topics":[]}