{"doi":"10.1073/pnas.36.1.48","title":"Equilibrium points in\n            <i>n</i>\n            -person games","abstract":"One may define a concept of an n -person game in which each player has a finite set of pure strategies and in which a definite set of payments to the n players corresponds to each n -tuple of pure strategies, one strategy being taken for each player. For mixed strategies, which are probability distributions over the pure strategies, the pay-off functions are the expectations of the players, thus becoming polylinear forms …","journal":"Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences","year":1950,"id":3429,"datarank":40.12739601045671,"base_score":8.892061625546935,"endowment":8.892061625546935,"self_citation_contribution":1.3338092438320404,"citation_network_contribution":38.793586766624664,"self_endowment_contribution":1.3338092438320404,"citer_contribution":38.793586766624664,"corpus_percentile":99.6,"corpus_rank":2130,"citation_count":7273,"citer_count":199,"citers_with_citation_signal":199,"citers_with_endowment":199,"datacite_reuse_total":0,"is_dataset":false,"is_oa":true,"file_count":0,"downloads":0,"has_version_chain":false,"published_date":"1950-01-01","authors":[{"id":16613,"name":"John F. Nash","orcid":null,"position":0,"is_corresponding":true}],"reference_count":2,"raw_metadata":{"citation_network_status":"fetched"},"created_at":"2026-03-01T18:20:47.508186Z","pmid":null,"pmcid":null,"fwci":null,"citation_percentile":null,"influential_citations":0,"oa_status":null,"license":null,"views":0,"total_file_size_bytes":0,"version_count":0,"clinical_trials":[],"software_tools":[],"db_accessions":[],"linked_datasets":[],"topics":[]}