{"doi":"10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee222.pub2","title":"Intuitionism, Moral","abstract":"<jats:p>Some propositions seem true to us simply on the basis of our understanding what they say. For instance, it seems true that torturing babies just for the fun of it is wrong and so is punishing the innocent. That type of seeming is called an<jats:italic>a priori</jats:italic>intuition, and moral intuitionism is the view that an<jats:italic>a priori</jats:italic>intuition about a moral proposition can be evidence (provide a reason) to believe that it is true. Critics question how seemings that are not based on observation could justify us in believing anything, and point to disagreement in intuitions among nonphilosophers from different cultures and socioeconomic classes, and between philosophers, to question whether<jats:italic>a priori</jats:italic>intuitions do provide evidence. This entry discusses the nature of moral intuitions, some criticisms of their claimed evidential weight, and some replies to those criticisms<jats:bold>.</jats:bold></jats:p>","journal":"The International Encyclopedia of Ethics","year":2023,"id":23329,"datarank":0.0,"base_score":0.0,"endowment":0.0,"self_citation_contribution":0.0,"citation_network_contribution":0.0,"self_endowment_contribution":0.0,"citer_contribution":0.0,"corpus_percentile":null,"corpus_rank":null,"citation_count":0,"citer_count":0,"citers_with_citation_signal":0,"citers_with_endowment":0,"datacite_reuse_total":0,"is_dataset":false,"is_dataset_confidence":null,"is_data_producer":false,"deposit_databanks":null,"is_oa":false,"file_count":0,"downloads":0,"has_version_chain":false,"published_date":null,"fair_score":null,"fair_percentile":null,"algorithm_id":"datarank_citation_only_1hop_v6","ranking_scope":"data_only","authors":[{"id":143597,"name":"Bruce Russell","orcid":null,"position":0,"is_corresponding":false}],"reference_count":0,"raw_metadata":{"has_enrichment":true,"base_score":0.0,"endowment":0.0,"datacite_reuse_total":0,"file_count":0,"downloads":0,"views":0,"has_version_chain":false,"is_dataset":false,"is_oa":false,"pmid":"24259432","pmcid":null,"openalex_id":"https://openalex.org/W4379911732","authors":[],"funders":[],"total_grants":0,"fwci":null,"citation_percentile":null,"influential_citations":0,"citation_trend":[],"oa_status":"closed","license":"http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1","oa_locations":[{"url":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee222.pub2","host_type":"publisher"},{"url":"http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee222.pub2","host_type":"journal"}],"fields_of_study":["Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment","Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics","Philosophical Ethics and Theory"],"mesh_terms":[],"keywords":["Intuitionism","Intuition","Proposition","Epistemology","A priori and a posteriori","Philosophy","Social intuitionism","Psychology","Moral reasoning","Moral authority"],"sdg_mappings":[{"sdg_number":0,"sdg_label":"Peace, Justice and strong institutions"}],"linked_datasets":[],"clinical_trials":[],"software_tools":[],"database_accessions":[],"source":"live","citation_network_status":"fetched"},"created_at":"2026-06-07T19:11:11.829661Z","pmid":null,"pmcid":null,"fwci":null,"citation_percentile":null,"influential_citations":0,"oa_status":null,"license":null,"views":0,"total_file_size_bytes":0,"version_count":0,"fair_f":null,"fair_a":null,"fair_i":null,"fair_r":null,"fair_zscore":null,"fair_rationale":null,"fair_model":null,"fair_agent_version":null,"fair_fulltext_source":null,"fair_has_llm":null,"fair_computed_at":null,"clinical_trials":[],"software_tools":[],"db_accessions":[],"linked_datasets":[],"topics":[]}